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I. INTRODUCTION 
Primetime broadcasting can be a grisly place. NBC airs 
kidnappings and rapes on Law and Order: Special Victims Unit; CBS 
presents gruesome murders on CSI; and Fox allows Jack Bauer to 
beat and torture his way through several seasons of 24. The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC)—the federal agency charged 
with regulating the airwaves—does not have a problem with all of this 
violence and mayhem. What the FCC does consider unacceptable is 
the use of seven “filthy words” immortalized by George Carlin: 
“fuck,” “shit,” “cocksucker,” “piss,” “twat,” “turd,” and “fart.”1 
Although the FCC historically penalized networks only for the 
repeated use of these words, Janet Jackson’s infamous “wardrobe 
malfunction” during the 2004 Super Bowl halftime show prompted 
the FCC to aggressively pursue broadcasters for even the fleeting use 
of forbidden words and images.2 In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc.,3 several broadcasters are seeking review of the FCC’s policies 
and have presented the Supreme Court with the first facial challenge 
to the FCC’s regulatory power over the airwaves in several decades.4 
First, this commentary will examine the various incidents at issue 
in FCC v. Fox. After analyzing the legal background and the positions 
 
* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  Brief for Petitioners at 4, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 10-1293 (U.S. Sept. 
7, 2011); see also George Carlin, The Seven Words You Cannot Say on Television, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3_Nrp7cj_tM&feature=youtu.be (last visited Mar. 14, 2012). 
Initially, the FCC focused its indecency-enforcement policy solely on the sustained and repeated 
use of the words in the Carlin monologue. Brief for Petitioners at 5. It would later expand its 
definition of “indecent” in response to broadcasts that eschewed the filthy words but remained 
extremely offensive. Id. at 6. 
 2.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 10. 
 3.  Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, No. 10-1293 (U.S. argued Jan. 10, 2012). 
 4.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 8–10. 
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of the FCC and the Respondents, this commentary argues that the 
Supreme Court should overrule a decades-old precedent and allow 
television broadcasters to operate free of almost any restrictions on 
content. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Four separate incidents are at issue in this case. Although three of 
these incidents involved the use of profanity, the fourth concerned a 
seven-second image of a woman’s naked backside. The first violation 
occurred on December 9th, 2002, during Fox Television’s live 
broadcast of the Billboard Music Awards.5 The singer Cher incurred 
an FCC fine for Fox when she remarked during an improvised 
acceptance speech: “I’ve had my critics for the last 40 years saying I 
was on my way out every year. Right. So fuck ‘em. I still have a job 
and they don’t.”6 Bono, the lead singer of the band U2, provoked the 
FCC to issue a fine against NBC in January, 2003, when he said, “[t]his 
is really fucking brilliant” on live television.7 On December 10th, 2003, 
Fox again broadcasted the Billboard Music Awards, this time hosted 
by Paris Hilton and Nicole Richie. The FCC took issue with one of 
Richie’s offhand remarks about her popular reality show The Simple 
Life, specifically: “Why do they even call it ‘The Simple Life?’ Have 
you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking 
simple.”8 
The final incident consolidated into FCC v. Fox stemmed from the 
February 25th, 2003, airing of NYPD Blue. The episode, titled “Nude 
Awakening,” contained an opening sequence that showed “the side of 
one of [a woman’s] breasts and a full view of her back.”9 A few 
seconds later “the camera . . . pan[ned] down to a shot of her buttocks, 
linger[ed] for a moment, and then pan[ned] up her back.”10 Each of 
the ABC affiliates that aired the episode incurred a $27,500 fine from 
the FCC.11 
 
 5.  Id. at 10. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 9. 
 8.  Id. at 11. 
 9.  Id. at 15. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 16. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
There are four sources of authority that will weigh heavily in the 
Supreme Court’s decision. First, the Court will look to the FCC’s 
statutory authority to police the airwaves. Second, the Court will need 
to consider how well its landmark decision in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation12 has stood the test of time. Third, the Court will examine 
the FCC’s pattern of enforcement over the decades. Finally, two other 
precedent cases will color the Court’s thinking about the reach of 
Pacifica. 
A. The FCC’s Statutory Authority 
The Communications Act of 1934, 18 U.S.C. § 1464, both 
established the FCC and placed limitations on broadcasters, stating 
that anyone “who utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language 
by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”13 The original statute, 
however, specifically stated that the FCC—then simply a radio-
licensing agency—would not enjoy the power to censor the airwaves 
or enforce § 1464.14 Congress later granted the FCC the authority to 
levy civil forfeitures against broadcasters or members of the public 
who violated § 1464 by issuing a fine to the offending party that could 
be appealed and reviewed in federal court.15 
B. The Pacifica Decision 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that certain types of 
“obscene” speech are outside the bounds of First Amendment 
protection.16 What constituted acceptable regulation of “indecent” 
speech on the airwaves that did not rise to the level of obscenity, 
however, remained an open question until the Supreme Court’s 
 
 12.  438 U.S. 736 (1978). 
 13.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1464 (West 2011). 
 14.  47 U.S.C.A. § 326 (West 2011). Congress did not originally give any executive branch 
agency an explicit mandate to enforce § 1464, leaving it as a general criminal prohibition. 
Section 326, however, specifically withheld the authority to censor the airwaves from the FCC, 
leaving it to the Department of Justice to bring criminal charges. For a discussion of the 
legislative history of this prohibition, see Brief for Respondents, infra note 18, at 3. 
 15.  47 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (West 2011). 
 16.  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). Miller established that in order to be 
considered obscene, speech must depict sexual activities in a manner that an average member of 
the community would find to be patently offensive. Id. at 25. Moreover, the work, taken as a 
whole, must also lack serious artistic, scientific, literary, or political value. Id. 
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decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.17 In that case, the Pacifica 
Radio Foundation broadcasted George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” 
monologue, which inquired why certain words were considered to be 
indecent, prompting the FCC to fine Pacifica for indecency.18 Pacifica 
challenged the FCC’s decision and claimed that regulation of indecent 
speech violated its First Amendment rights. 
The Supreme Court rejected Pacifica’s argument and held that 
broadcasting does not receive the same level of First Amendment 
protection afforded to other forms of expression.19 The Court first 
found that Carlin’s deliberate, repetitive, and provocative use of the 
“seven words” constituted indecent (but not obscene) speech within 
the meaning of § 1464.20 The Court further held that regulation of 
indecent speech on the public airwaves was acceptable under the First 
Amendment because of two unique features of radio and television 
broadcasts.21 First, radio and television broadcasts were “a uniquely 
pervasive presence” in the United States, and indecent programming 
was therefore akin to a public nuisance coming uninvited into homes 
and private lives.22 Second, because broadcasting was uniquely 
accessible to children, the government had a legitimate interest in 
shielding children from programming that could “enlarge [their] 
vocabulary in an instant.”23 
C. The FCC’s Enforcement Policy 
The Supreme Court limited its holding in Pacifica by declining to 
address whether “the isolated use of a potentially offensive word” 
could be constitutionally restricted.24 Accordingly, the FCC initially 
interpreted its authority narrowly by confining its enforcement to 
cases involving the repeated and sustained use of Carlin’s filthy 
words.25 This under-inclusive policy was problematic, however, 
 
 17.  See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749 (holding indecent speech may be regulated on radio and 
television broadcasts). 
 18.  Brief for Respondents at 4, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 10-1293 (U.S. 
May 23, 2011). 
 19.  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749–50 (holding that the unique characteristics of broadcasting 
justified a lower level of First Amendment protection from government interference). 
 20.  Id. at 739–41. 
 21.  Id. at 748–49. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 749. 
 24.  Id. at 760–61 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 25.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 6. The Omnibus Order issued by the FCC in 
2006 was both a statement of policy and a historical compilation of different decisions made by 
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because limiting enforcement to only those specific words allowed for 
the broadcasting of indecent material through creative, yet still 
offensive, ways to describe sexual and execretory acts.26 In 1987, the 
FCC revised its enforcement policy by adopting a context-specific 
approach that examined the words used in a broadcast, the 
broadcast’s overall message, and the intended effect on the audience.27 
Despite this new policy, the FCC maintained a relaxed enforcement 
protocol, generally issuing fines for only the most egregious cases.28 
Starting in 2004, however, the FCC began to pursue perceived 
indecencies on the airwaves more aggressively, finding for the first 
time that even the isolated use of one of Carlin’s seven words was 
indecent and worthy of a fine.29 Responding to complaints and 
confusion from the broadcast networks, the FCC issued a new 
Omnibus Order in 2006 intended to clearly define the FCC’s new 
indecency definition and enforcement policy.30 
D. The Post-Pacifica Cases 
Two other cases regarding the FCC’s regulation of broadcasters 
will weigh in the Court’s consideration of FCC v. Fox. In FCC v. 
League of Women Voters,31 the Court struck down a statutory 
prohibition on publicly funded broadcasters airing editorial content. 
The Court noted that the government’s right to impose restrictions on 
the speech of broadcasters is not limitless.32 Instead, regulation of 
broadcasters’ First Amendment speech must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a “substantial government interest.”33 
 
 
 
the FCC over the preceding years. Id. at 7. The hope was that while the new policy was much 
more amorphous than the old one, the Omnibus Order could give some clarity to the networks 
by providing extensive illustrations of when the FCC decided to fine a network and when it 
decided to forgo censoring a broadcaster. Id. at 8. Most of the documents and briefs associated 
with this case therefore discuss the enforcement history of the FCC and the Omnibus Order 
somewhat interchangeably. 
 26.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 6 (describing a Howard Stern monologue that 
discussed masturbation and bestiality, among other subjects, without ever using the filthy 
words). 
 27.  Id. at 7. 
 28.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 5. 
 29.  Id. at 6. 
 30.  Id. at 7. 
 31.  468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
 32.  Id. at 377. 
 33.  Id. at 379. 
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There is some tension between this doctrine and a prior Supreme 
Court case, Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC.34 In Red Lion, the Court 
upheld the “fairness doctrine,” a longstanding set of FCC regulations 
requiring broadcasters to give those they criticize airtime and an 
opportunity to rebut accusations made against them.35 The Court first 
noted that since only a narrow band of the radio spectrum was 
suitable for broadcasts, and since only one broadcaster could 
effectively use a given frequency at any time, the broadcasters needed 
government involvement (in the form of a limited monopoly over 
certain frequencies) in order to operate effectively.36 Other media do 
not need comparable levels of government involvement to function 
properly.37 Because broadcasters need active government 
intervention, and because the government may set conditions on its 
aid to private actors, the government has the right to demand certain 
concessions from those to whom it grants a broadcast license.38 The 
Red Lion “scarcity doctrine” thus established that broadcasters are 
fundamentally different from others who engage in speech, and their 
First Amendment freedoms are therefore subject to greater intrusion 
by the government. 
IV. THE RULING BELOW 
The networks responded to the 2006 Omnibus Order by suing the 
FCC in federal court. They alleged that the new policy was 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment and 
that it exceeded the FCC’s authority under Pacifica to regulate speech 
protected by the First Amendment.39 The Second Circuit initially 
invalidated the Omnibus Order under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, ruling that the FCC had failed to adequately justify its change in 
policy. The Second Circuit did not, however, rule on the networks’ 
constitutional claims.40 The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the 
Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded for a ruling on whether the 
 
 34.  395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 35.  Id. at 374–75. 
 36.  Id. at 376. 
 37.  See id. at 387 (finding no need for government licenses and grants of limited 
monopolies for publishers of print media). 
 38.  See id. at 388–89 (discussing how the scarcity of usable radio bandwidth justifies 
government regulation of the airwaves to promote the public interest). 
 39.  Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 446–47 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. 
Ct. 1800 (2009). 
 40.  Id. 
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FCC’s policy violated the Fifth Amendment or exceeded Pacifica’s 
restrictions on First Amendment speech.41 
On remand, the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC’s current 
indecency-enforcement policy is unconstitutionally vague in violation 
of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.42 As the Second 
Circuit was bound by Pacifica to reject the networks’ First 
Amendment challenges, it concluded that “[w]e do not suggest that 
the FCC could not create a constitutional policy. We hold only that 
the FCC’s current policy fails constitutional scrutiny.”43 
The court’s opinion detailed what the judges believed to be an 
inexplicable pattern of enforcement by the FCC.44 This violated the 
classic void-for-vagueness test since sophisticated networks, much less 
a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, could not predict 
what the FCC would consider to be indecent programming.45 For 
example, in many episodes of NYPD Blue, the FCC found the use of 
the word “bullshit” to be indecent but allowed the networks to say 
“dick,” “dickhead,” “up yours,” “pissed off,” and “kiss my ass.”46 Given 
that these phrases describe far more graphic activities than bovine 
defecation, these examples are perplexing. Moreover, although the 
FCC fined broadcasters for the isolated and unscripted use of single 
expletives, it allowed all of the words on Carlin’s list to be used during 
unedited airings of the film Saving Private Ryan.47 The FCC justified 
the distinction on artistic grounds, claiming that the power and 
realism of Saving Private Ryan would be severely diminished if the 
offensive words were edited out, but the court found that this half-
formed “artistic necessity doctrine” merely added another layer of 
confusion and ambiguity to the enforcement standard.48 The court 
held that the policy’s ambiguity not only resulted in fines for the 
networks but also chilled their legitimate exercise of First 
Amendment speech.49 As an example, the court noted that several 
CBS affiliates—fearing regulatory action by the FCC—refused to air 
 
 41.  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009). 
 42.  Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 461 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 
S. Ct. 3065 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1293). 
 43.  Id. at 335. 
 44.  Id. at 330–31. 
 45.  Id. at 327 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). 
 46.  Id. at 330. 
 47.  Id. at 331. 
 48.  Id. at 333. 
 49.  Id. at 335. 
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an award-winning documentary about the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
because the film contained expletive-filled radio communications of 
firefighters and police officers.50 
V. ARGUMENTS 
The Supreme Court will first need to decide whether to uphold 
the Second Circuit’s ruling that the FCC’s current policy is 
unconstitutionally vague. Even if the Court finds that the FCC’s 
policy passes muster under the Fifth Amendment, it will still need to 
consider the facial challenge to Pacifica brought by the networks.  
A.  The Fifth Amendment Vagueness Claim 
1. The FCC’s Attack on the Second Circuit Ruling 
The FCC’s central contention on appeal to the Supreme Court is 
that the Second Circuit improperly applied the test for 
unconstitutional vagueness. The FCC argues that the Second Circuit 
should have considered only whether the policy was unconstitutional 
as applied to the broadcasters in this case, not whether the policy was 
unconstitutionally vague on its face.51 The FCC also points out that 
the networks’ own internal guidelines prohibit the use of expletives 
and images of nudity, implying that the broadcasters were already 
aware that using those words and images could be considered 
offensive.52 Moreover, in the cases in question, the expletives were not 
used to advance any kind of artistic, political, or social commentary, 
but were merely instances of celebrities making fools of themselves 
on camera.53 Wherever the murky boundaries of indecent language 
may lie, there was no reason for Fox to believe that allowing Nicole 
Richie to complain about “cow shit” in her Prada purse was decent 
broadcasting within the meaning of § 1464.54 
The FCC gives three reasons why a flexible definition is both 
harmless and desirable because of the particular nature of 
broadcasting.55 First, the indecency standards are not enforced against 
members of the general public but only against a handful of large, 
 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 17. 
 52.  Id. at 28. 
 53.  Id. at 29. 
 54.  Id. at 31. 
 55.  Id. at 33–36. 
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sophisticated, and well-informed corporations.56 Thus, concerns that 
ordinary citizens cannot distinguish between what a vague statute 
allows and proscribes are not present here.57 Second, any harm done 
by an amorphous policy is likely to be minimal as the networks’ own 
internal guidelines are actually more restrictive than the FCC’s 
requirements—the broadcasting companies and, in fact, most cable 
channels (which are not subject to FCC regulation) generally prohibit 
the use of Carlin’s words and voluntarily censor expletives during live 
broadcasts.58 This “self-censorship,” combined with the fact that 
graphic descriptions of sexual and excretory activity are not generally 
considered within the core of the First Amendment, means that a 
vague policy “is unlikely to foreclose a substantial amount of 
broadcast speech.”59 Third, an inflexible indecency standard would 
allow broadcasters to air extremely offensive material while avoiding 
sanction by simply using words, phrases, and images that are not 
explicitly prohibited by the FCC.60 A policy focusing only on 
particular images and words, without looking at context, would not be 
able to keep provocateurs from exploiting the malleability of the 
spoken word and circumventing the purpose of the statutory 
prohibitions.61 So long as the FCC is required to police the public 
airwaves, a certain level of ambiguity in the indecency policy is both 
necessary and desirable. 
2. Respondents’ Reply 
Although the FCC’s Fifth Amendment arguments center on 
whether the broadcasters had sufficient notice that the isolated use of 
expletives and nudity might be considered indecent, Respondents 
contend that the main question for the Court is whether the 
indecency definition is so vague as to invite arbitrary and capricious 
enforcement.62 Respondents further argue that both the FCC’s 
indecency-enforcement policy and its actual enforcement decisions 
reveal a pattern of subjective judgments and decisions. Because each 
 
 56.  Id. at 34. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 35. 
 59.  See id. at 35–36 (arguing that even a vague policy will not have any significant chilling 
effect on speech). 
 60.  Id. at 35. 
 61.  See id. (pointing out attempts by “shock jocks” to air offensive broadcasts without 
using any prohibited words). 
 62.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 41. 
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instance of indecency is determined individually, “the FCC may now 
decide indecency complaints based on one, some, or all of the factors 
it had previously announced, or it can decide cases on ‘other’ factors it 
chooses to invoke at its whim.”63 This level of subjective judgment has 
led to an enforcement pattern that is difficult to rationalize and even 
more difficult for the networks to follow without gross amounts of 
self-censorship. For example, the FCC declared that expletives were 
acceptable in Saving Private Ryan because of the realistic nature of 
the film but not in other works that strive for high levels of 
authenticity and realism.64  
First, Respondents argue that the FCC’s indecency standards are 
unconstitutionally vague even as applied to the specific incidents in 
this case.65 The FCC had previously declined to hold that the isolated 
and fleeting use of an expletive constituted indecent speech.66 
Additionally, Respondents contend that a court need not find that a 
law was impermissibly vague as applied to a specific case, but only 
that there is a real and substantial risk that the law’s vagueness would 
invite arbitrary and capricious enforcement.67 
Second, Respondents argue that even if the pattern of 
enforcement could be rationalized, the FCC’s definition is 
impermissibly vague on its face.68 Respondents rely on Reno v. 
ACLU,69 in which the Court found that an identical definition of 
indecency used by another government agency was unconstitutional.70 
Because the definition of indecency relies on an amorphous appeal to 
community standards instead of objective criteria,71 the FCC’s 
 
 63.  Id. at 44 (referencing language from the FCC’s Omnibus Order allowing the agency to 
use factors not enumerated in agency policy to make indecency judgments). 
 64.  Id. at 45 (comparing the FCC’s decision on Saving Private Ryan to its decision that 
Martin Scorsese’s inclusion of expletives in a documentary about Blues performers was 
“shocking”). 
 65.  Id. at 53. 
 66.  Id. at 54 (pointing out that all the cases cited by the government as putting the 
networks on notice were instances of egregiously offensive conduct). 
 67.  Id. at 52. 
 68.  See id. (noting that the policy does not list any objective definitions but only makes 
vague appeals to context). 
 69.  521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 70.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 40 (citing Reno, 521 U.S. at 870–74). 
 71.  Reno, 521 U.S. at 872–73 (pointing out that the test for obscenity articulated in Miller 
required not just that a work be considered offensive, but also that it lack any significant 
redeeming value). Unlike the community standard for offensiveness, whether a work has some 
larger scientific, political, or social purpose was considered to be a relatively fixed standard that 
did not vary much either by community or over time. Id. 
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enforcement can change at the whim of the agency. Consequently, 
broadcasters are unable to predict what the FCC will consider 
indecent in a given year.72 
Respondents agree that the Court should not rely on abstract 
hypotheticals when conducting this analysis, arguing that the Second 
Circuit used actual examples of FCC enforcement decisions to 
conclude that the law is impermissibly vague.73 The FCC’s indecency-
enforcement policy therefore violates the Fifth Amendment both on 
its face and as applied. 
B.  The First Amendment Claim 
1. Respondents’ Attack on Pacifica 
Beyond the Fifth Amendment issues confronted by the Second 
Circuit, Respondents invite the Supreme Court to strike down the 
FCC’s indecency policy on First Amendment grounds and to overrule 
Pacifica.74 Respondents argue that Pacifica rests almost entirely on 
two factual assumptions—the pervasiveness of broadcasting and its 
accessibility to children—which were dubious in 1978 and are 
demonstrably untrue in 2012.75 The media market of the 1970s may 
have been dominated by television and radio broadcasters, making 
network programming “uniquely pervasive,” but the introduction of 
cable television and the internet has completely reshaped mass 
communication.76 Respondents cite several statistics to prove this 
point: nearly ninety percent of American households subscribe to 
some kind of cable or satellite television package; only a quarter of all 
primetime viewers watch network television broadcasts; and most 
teenagers spend vastly more time watching cable programming or 
surfing the internet than viewing network broadcasts.77 Furthermore, 
these figures do not account for other new media, such as video 
games, that provide additional entertainment alternatives to 
traditional broadcasting.78 The Court has consistently rejected efforts 
to limit and regulate speech in these new media, leaving broadcasting 
 
 72.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 48. 
 73.  Id. at 49–50. 
 74.  Id. at 16–17. 
 75.  Id. at 17. 
 76.  Id. at 18. 
 77.  Id. at 18–19 (showing that teenagers spend two hours a day watching cable, compared 
to just thirty-eight minutes on network broadcasts). 
 78.  Id. at 20. 
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in the peculiar position of being the only variety of mass media where 
the government can regulate speech protected by the First 
Amendment.79 Respondents also argue that although broadcasting 
remains accessible to children, the internet and other new forms of 
media are just as easy for a child to view.80 In fact, at the same time 
that new technology such as the V-chip (which limits what programs 
can be seen on a television) has made broadcasting less accessible to 
children, the proliferation of smartphones and other mobile devices 
has made the internet and other new media an omnipresence in most 
children’s lives.81 Pacifica thus is an anachronism and should be 
overruled so that the law does not continue to be driven by a media 
market that no longer exists. 
Even if the Court decides not to overturn Pacifica, Respondents 
argue that Pacifica marks the outer limit of the FCC’s authority to 
regulate the airwaves and that the use of fleeting expletives or images 
of a woman’s back should not be subject to sanction.82 Under the 
League of Women Voters test, the FCC may regulate broadcasters’ 
speech only if its policy is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial 
government interest.83 Respondents argue that the FCC’s current 
enforcement policy fails both prongs of this test: there is neither a 
substantial government interest nor a narrowly tailored policy. There 
is no government interest in protecting children and squeamish adults 
from isolated and fleeting exposure to curse words and brief glimpses 
of parts of the naked body; children will learn the words eventually 
and everyone presumably has seen naked buttocks somewhere 
before.84 If Pacifica stands, Respondent argues, it should be read to 
limit the FCC’s authority to cover only the most shocking and 
egregious examples of indecent behavior. 
2. The FCC’s Defense of Pacifica 
The FCC contends that despite the post-1970s media revolution, 
broadcasting remains a uniquely pervasive medium that is particularly 
accessible to children.85 Over nineteen million households have 
televisions that only receive the broadcast networks, and broadcast 
 
 79.  Id. at 16. 
 80.  Id. at 21–22. 
 81.  Id. at 22. 
 82.  Id. at 26. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 26–27. 
 85.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 44. 
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programming continues to dominate the ratings charts.86 The FCC also 
cites statistics showing that thirty-four percent of children have a 
television in their bedroom without access to a cable or satellite 
package.87 Broadcasting remains the easiest medium for children to 
access because only a television and a power source are required to 
view it, while cable and the internet require other affirmative steps by 
the user.88 The fact that broadcasting might no longer be the nearly 
exclusive source of at-home entertainment does not preclude its 
continued dominance. 
The FCC also relies on the Red Lion scarcity doctrine to justify its 
continued enforcement of indecency standards. Because broadcasters 
could not operate without a monopoly on certain frequencies granted 
and enforced by the government, the government is in turn allowed to 
require broadcasters to operate in a manner that promotes the public 
interest.89 Just as broadcasters have, in the interests of public discourse 
and fairness, been required to give equal airtime to those they 
criticize, so too must the networks preserve their programming as a 
safe haven from cruder media.90 The grant of a broadcast license thus 
amounts to a bargain between the government and a network, and the 
FCC is well within its rights to promote the government’s side of that 
deal. 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The FCC is going to lose this case and the only question is how 
badly. The current indecency-enforcement standards have been 
applied erratically over the last decade and are impermissibly vague 
both in general and as applied to the facts of this case. In all 
likelihood, the Court will issue a limited decision that strikes down 
the FCC policy on vagueness grounds and does not reach the First 
Amendment issue. Pacifica, however, was explicitly grounded on a set 
of facts that simply are not true today and the Court should take this 
opportunity to overrule an antiquated case. Given what the Roberts 
Court has found to be worthy of First Amendment protection, 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See id. at 46 (citing statistics about overall access to broadcast television). 
 88.  Id. at 46–47. 
 89.  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
1, at 42–43. 
 90.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 43 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376 (holding 
that the unique elements of broadcasting allow the government to make special demands on the 
grantees of broadcast licenses)). 
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Pacifica should be overruled and the networks should be allowed to 
broadcast any and all material protected by the Constitution. 
A. Vagueness: In General and As Applied 
The FCC’s indecency-enforcement policy embodied in its 
Omnibus Order is vague on its face. The FCC issued the Omnibus 
Order so that broadcasters could understand how its new policy 
would work in practice, but this is impossible given the FCC’s erratic 
pattern of enforcement. For example, the FCC sanctions the networks 
for the momentary use of expletives but allowed their repeated use in 
Saving Private Ryan.91 The FCC ruled that the use of those words was 
artistically necessary in the context of that film, but it found a 
documentary on the Blues, which contained interviews with musicians 
using expletives to talk candidly about their lives and works, to be 
indecent.92 There are no objective criteria that make the use of 
expletives artistically necessary in a work of fiction but not in a 
documentary. Moreover, any subjective judgments the FCC makes 
about art would be arbitrary by definition. This vague and ambiguous 
policy contrasts with the pre-2004 indecency definition, which focused 
on the sustained repetition of the filthy words or gratuitous and 
graphic depictions of sexual and excretory activities.93 This policy, in 
practice, was used only against egregiously offensive broadcasts.94 
The FCC is correct that any indecency standard that ignores 
context will inevitably lead to incoherent results. Context, however, is 
perhaps the opposite of a specific and pre-determined standard, and 
the FCC provides no uniform set of principles to guide its 
determinations.95 Perhaps the most telling factor is that the FCC does 
not contend anywhere in its brief that it enforces its indecency policy 
evenhandedly.96 The FCC instead asserts that the central question for 
 
 91.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 45 (discussing the pattern of enforcement laid 
out in the Omnibus Order). 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Abigail T. Rom, Note, From Carlin’s Seven to Bono’s One: The Federal 
Communications Commission’s Regulation of Those Words You Can Never Say on Broadcast 
Television, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 705, 732–35 (2010) (arguing that the new indecency policy gives 
unconstitutional levels of discretion when compared with the old regime, and pointing out that 
the FCC previously had declined to act against broadcasts that contained isolated expletives and 
only fined networks whose programming approached Carlin levels of offensiveness). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 47 (arguing that the government has failed 
to actually argue that the policy is clear and not enforced arbitrarily). 
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the Court is not arbitrary enforcement in other instances, but whether 
it was capricious to fine the broadcasters for the incidents at issue 
here.97 
Even if the Court adopts the “as applied” framework urged by the 
FCC, it is still likely to hold that the indecency definition is 
impermissibly vague. Because for over two decades the FCC explicitly 
held that the isolated use of an expletive was not indecent, Fox could 
not have expected to incur liability by allowing Richie to ad lib on live 
television.98 Although the FCC cites several instances where it fined 
broadcasters for the use of the filthy words, all of those violations 
involved the deliberate and repeated use of profanity.99 
The way the FCC approaches other words only further clouds the 
matter. The word “fuck” is considered presumptively indecent by the 
FCC because of its sexual connotations,100 but was used by Bono 
merely as a point of emphasis and not in a sexual manner. The phrases 
“kiss my ass” and “up yours” describe graphic sexual activities, but are 
allowed on television.101 The only defense offered for this distinction is 
merely that unlike the approved words and phrases, “fuck” and “shit” 
are intrinsically offensive because of their basic meanings102—an odd 
conclusion given that “up yours” describes an action that involves the 
core definitions of both “fuck” and “shit.” Furthermore, if the words 
“fuck” and “shit” are considered offensive in and of themselves, 
regardless of how they are used, then the FCC should not have 
permitted the unedited broadcast of Saving Private Ryan. There is 
simply no way to make sense of the totality of the FCC’s new 
enforcement regime without falling back on the subjective, and 
therefore unconstitutional, aesthetic judgments of the agency. Nor 
does this necessarily mean that the FCC must ignore context and 
publish an exhaustive list of words and phrases that may not be used 
on television; rather, only that their contextual standard must be 
limited by clear, objective criteria, similar to those used in Miller v. 
California103 to determine what constitutes an obscenity.104 At a 
 
 97.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 25. 
 98. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 5 (pointing to the FCC’s historical practice 
of not fining networks for fleeting expletives). 
 99.  Id. at 54. 
 100.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 28 (discussing the FCC’s awareness that the 
“F-Word” is inconsistent with contemporary community standards). 
 101.  Id. at 28–29. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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minimum, therefore, the Court is likely to find the FCC indecency 
policy unconstitutionally vague, to dismiss the fines, and to require the 
agency to promulgate a new policy.105 
B. The End of Pacifica 
If the Court rules for the Respondents on the vagueness issue, it 
may decide not to address Pacifica. In the last two years, however, the 
Court has found that shouting homophobic slurs and “thank God for 
dead soldiers” at a military funeral is fully protected speech,106 that 
video games involving lighting school girls on fire and then urinating 
on them are just as worthy of First Amendment protection as The 
Divine Comedy,107 and that contributions to political campaigns by 
corporations cannot be constitutionally restricted.108 For the Court to 
then decide to draw a line in the sand at a seven-second image of a 
naked woman’s posterior would be absurd. The Court should take this 
opportunity to overrule Pacifica and strike down all limitations on 
First Amendment activities by broadcasters. The decision to overturn 
Pacifica ought to be straightforward given that Pacifica was driven 
entirely by circumstances that simply no longer exist. It probably was 
fair to characterize broadcasting as a uniquely pervasive medium in 
1978. Most houses had televisions or radios and—in the dark days 
before basic cable—broadcast radio and television were the exclusive 
forms of mass media that could be consumed in the home.109 Today, 
broadcast networks are better known as what you must scroll past on 
the interactive guide before arriving at HBO, Starz, and the Playboy 
Channel. DVDs and Netflix have added to what a television set can 
do, and this is before considering the magnitude of entertainment 
options available through Xbox 360, PlayStation 3, or Wii. Above all 
else, though, the internet’s explosive growth guarantees that 
 
 104.  Id. at 24 (outlining a test for obscenity that requires, among other things, a finding that 
an average and reasonable member of the community would find a work, taken as a whole, to 
appeal to a prurient interest in sex). 
 105.  See Jerome A. Barron, Comment, FCC v. Fox Television Stations and the FCC’s New 
Fleeting Expletive Policy, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 567, 584 (2010) (predicting that the Court will 
uphold Pacifica but strike down the new FCC policy). 
 106.  See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213, 1220–21 (2011) (holding that the openly 
offensive anti-gay protests by the Westboro Baptist Church at military funerals are protected 
speech). 
 107.  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 n.4, 2738 (2011) (holding that 
extremely violent video games are protected speech). 
 108.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916–17 (2010) (holding that expenditures 
on political campaigns by corporations are protected speech). 
 109.  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–50 (1978). 
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broadcasting will never again be the only form of truly mass media.110 
Given the substantially reduced role of broadcast television and 
radio in the modern media marketplace, it is hard to contend that 
broadcasting is more accessible to children than the internet. The 
FCC contends that accessing the internet requires certain “affirmative 
steps” that accessing broadcasting does not, but even taken at face 
value this argument only accounts for the home environment and 
ignores the fact that children have access to the internet almost 
everywhere—in schools, in libraries, on their smartphones, and even 
on their friends’ smartphones.111 Pacifica is an anachronism that only 
made sense in a world where home entertainment was confined to 
three channels and a radio set. 
If Pacifica stands, it is not likely to be expanded to cover the 
present case.112 The Court ruled in 1978: “It is appropriate, in 
conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our holding . . . . We have 
not decided that an occasional expletive . . . would justify any 
sanction.”113 This passage was written before the advent of cable 
television and the internet, and becomes particularly important when 
the use of fleeting expletives and images of a woman’s naked back are 
considered under the League of Women Voters test. It is difficult to 
articulate what actual harm results from children occasionally hearing 
words they will learn eventually or from briefly seeing familiar parts 
of the human body in a non-sexual context. Indeed, many high school 
students now read the classic novel Ulysses, once considered obscene 
because of its use of expletives.114 Revealingly, the FCC does not 
attempt to articulate any significant government interest in forcing 
broadcasters into an unnaturally clean style of speech. Instead, the 
FCC declares that the Court should not require it to articulate why it 
is so important that children not learn explicit words from the 
television instead of from their parents, teachers, coaches, or fellow 
 
 110.  See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 326 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
131 S. Ct. 3065 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1293) (pointing out that the internet has already 
become a dominant form of media and will only become more important in the future). 
 111.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 47–48 (illustrating the pervasive presence of 
the internet today). 
 112.  See Barron, supra note 105, at 585 (predicting that the Court will uphold Pacifica but 
strike down the new FCC policy). 
 113.  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. 
 114.  Cara L. Newman, Note, Eyes Wide Open, Minds Wide Shut: Art, Obscenity, and the 
First Amendment in Contemporary America, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 121, 134–35 (2003) (discussing 
how Ulysses caused a shift in what was considered obscene). 
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third graders.115 The proposed expansion of the Pacifica holding to 
cover fleeting expletives thus clearly runs afoul of League of Women 
Voters and should be rejected. 
The Court is also unlikely to agree with the FCC’s justifications 
based on Red Lion. As Respondents point out, the requirements 
upheld in Red Lion and similar cases were affirmative duties imposed 
on broadcasters to allow others access to the airwaves—a natural 
requirement given the demand for broadcast licenses and the limited 
number of usable frequencies.116 The scarcity doctrine might impose 
affirmative duties on license holders, but this does not mean that 
broadcasters enjoy less First Amendment protection than other 
actors.117 The FCC’s argument requires the Court to actually expand 
the holding of Red Lion, rather than simply follow a controlling 
precedent. Therefore, the Court is likely to extend to broadcasters the 
full protection of the First Amendment—a right they have been 
denied for more than thirty years. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It made a certain amount of sense to subject broadcasters to 
greater regulation when mass media consisted of four television 
stations, AM and FM radio, and perhaps one or two significant movie 
releases a week. The world could not be more different today. 
Broadcast television is a fleeting afterthought in an exploding media 
marketplace and could become obsolete as the internet generation 
comes of age. The Court should recognize this new reality and give 
television the right to be just as absurd and indecent as YouTube. 
 
 
 115.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 20–21 (discussing how even a single uttered 
expletive can cause a damaging expansion in a child’s vocabulary). 
 116.  See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969) (finding that the number 
of persons seeking a broadcast license greatly exceeds the available space in the electromagnetic 
spectrum; broadcast space is therefore a uniquely scarce resource). 
 117.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 37. Respondents also note throughout their 
discussion of Red Lion that the growth of other forms of media has undercut demand for space 
on the radio frequency and reduced the uniquely pervasive presence of broadcasting. Id. This 
undermines the basic scarcity rationale for Red Lion and calls the continued viability of that 
case into question as well. Id. (pointing out that Red Lion was always believed to have a 
“limited shelf life”). 
